If we are caught over the years in the wider context of other agreements, declarations and promises made to the actors of the region, we see how the agreement is at the root of so many contemporary problems. In the Sykes-Picot Agreement, concluded on 19 May 1916, France and Great Britain divided the Arab territories of the former Ottoman Empire into spheres of influence. In its intended area, it was agreed that each country can establish a direct or indirect administration or control, as they wish and as they see fit to agree with the Arab State or with the Arab confederation. Under Sykes-Picot, the Syrian coast and much of present-day Lebanon went to France; Britain would take direct control of central and southern Mesopotamia around the provinces of Baghdad and Basra. Palestine would have an international administration, because other Christian powers, namely Russia, were interested in this region. The rest of the territory in question – a vast territory with syria today, Mosul in northern Iraq and Jordan – would have local Arab leaders under French surveillance to the north and Britons to the south. In addition, Britain and France would retain free passage and trade within the other`s zone of influence. The Arabs regarded McMahon`s promise as a formal agreement that could have been. Among the borders proposed by Hussein was Palestine. But this area was not explicitly mentioned in the McMahon-Hussein correspondence. In April 1920, the San Remo conference distributed Class A mandates on Syria to France and Iraq and Palestine to Britain. The same conference ratified an oil agreement reached at a London conference on 12 February, based on a slightly different version of the Long Berenger agreement, previously signed on 21 December in London.
On 18 September Faisal met in London and the next day and 23 had long meetings with Lloyd George, who explained the memory aid and the British position. Lloyd George stated that he was “in the position of a man who had inherited two groups of commitments, those of King Hussein and those of the French,” Faisal noted that the agreement “seemed to be based on the 1916 agreement between the British and the French.” Clemenceau responded about Memory Aid, refusing to travel to Syria and saying that the case should be left to the French to directly manage Fayçal. After the Constantinople Agreement, the French turned to the British to develop their reciprocal desiderata and the British set up the De Bunsen Committee on 8 April 1915 to examine British options.  Zionism was not taken into account in the June 1915 Committee report, which concluded that in the event of division or zone of influence, there must be a British sphere of influence that included Palestine, while accepting that there be relevant French and Russian interests, as well as Islamic interests, in Jerusalem and in the holy places.   The Franco-British agreement faced a double opposition: the Turkish national revolt of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in Anatolia, which opposed the Treaty of Sevres; and the rise of hashemites to power in Mesopotamia (now Iraq) and Syria. For a period of twenty years, the existing Turkish tariff remains in effect in all blue and red zones as well as in zones (a) and b) and there is no increase in tariffs or conversions of value at certain rates, unless agreed between the two powers.